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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, SfATE OF UTAH
GILBERT R. WILBURN,
Applicant/Appellant,
Court of Appeals
Case No. 860202-CA

vs.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

Category No. 6

Defendants/Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT GILBERT R. WILBURN

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-90 (1953 as amended)
states that no agreement by an employee to waive his rights to
compensation under the Utah Workers Compensation Act shall be
valid.

In accordance with case law interpreting this

provision, settlements should only be allowed where the issue
of compensability is truly doubtful.

Furthermore, any

agreement which purports to settle an injured worker's claim to
worker's compensation benefits should be strictly construed
according to its express terms so that no inadvertent waivers
occur.

Inasmuch as a settlement agreement is a contract, its

scope and effect must be interpreted in accordance with general
principles of contract law.

The interpretation of a contract

is a question of law for determination by the Court.

In the

case of an integrated contract unambiguous on its face, the

meaning of the document is to be determined solely from the
four corners of the document itself.

Furthermore, in the event

of facial ambiguities within the document, the rules of
construction require resolution in favor of the non-drafting
party.
In the instant case, the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement executed by the applicant is invalid inasmuch as the
compensability of Mr. Wilburn's injury was not seriously in
doubt.

(See copy of Compromise and Settlement Agreement

attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A.)

Furthermore, the

Administrative Law Judge improperly relied on parol evidence
presented at the time of the hearing to vary the express terms
of the written document.

Because the interpretation of a

contract is a question of law, and because the issue presented
on appeal involves the interpretation of a contract, this court
has original jurisdiction to review the evidence and make its
own finding as to the effect of the agreement at issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMPENSABLE NATURE OF MR. WILBURN'S INDUSTRIAL
INJURY WAS NOT DOUBTFUL AT THE TIME THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED AND EXECUTED.
Respondents allege that appellant would have the
Court find all worker's compensation settlement agreements to
be invalid in view of the statutory prohibition against waivers
found in U.C.A. §35-1-90. This allegation is misleading and
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seriously misconstrues appellant's position.

It is not

contested and, in fact, Mr. Wilburn agrees with the position
espoused by the respondents that the settlement of disputed
industrial claims is desirable and should be encouraged.
However, because of the statutory prohibition against waivers,
such settlements should only be encouraged under appropriate
circumstances, namely where the compensable nature of the
worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to recover
is doubtful.

See Brigham Young University v. Industrial

Commission, 279 P. 889 (Utah 1929).

Where compensability is

not a genuine matter of dispute, settlement is inappropriate
and should not be allowed.

Furthermore! where settlement is

appropriate, any documents executed in furtherance of the
settlement should be strictly construed according to their
express terms so that only those claims and rights specifically
identified are compromised.

This requirement, rather than

undermining the settlement process as alleged by respondents,
would simply encourage careful drafting|so that all parties are
aware of the full effect of any agreement between them.
At the time the Compromise and Settlement Agreement
in question was negotiated, the term "accident" was defined for
purposes of worker's compensation law as follows:
It [accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events. . . 1 [T]his is not
necessarily restricted to some single
incident which happened suddenly at one
particular time and does not preclude the
possibility that due to exertion, stress or
other repetitive cause, a climax might be
reached in such a manner as to properly fall
3

within the definition of an accident as just
stated above. However, such an occurrence
must be distinguished from gradually
developing conditions which are classified as
occupational diseases and which are not
compensable except as provided in Chapter 2
of Title 35 (Sections 35-2-1, et. seq.)/
U.C.A. 1953. (Footnotes omitted.)
Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
202, 203 (1965).

The events giving rise to Mr. Wilburn's

industrial injury clearly fall within the parameters of the
definition set forth above.

At the time of his industrial

injury, appellant was working for respondent Interstate
Electric as a heavy duty mechanic repairing and overhauling,
among other things, portable power plants.

On the day he was

injured Mr. Wilburn attempted to lift a portable power plant
weighing approximately 100 pounds from the floor to his work
bench so that he could commence its repair.

(R. at 350.)

This

particular power plant had a handle on it so that instead of
lifting it from the front as he generally did, Mr. Wilburn
bent over sideways and lifted the plant with one hand from his
side.

(R. at 355.)

pain in his back.

After lifting the plant, he felt a sharp
(R. at 54, 55.)

In view of the amount of

weight Mr. Wilburn was lifting, the unusual manner in which
he attempted to make the lift, and the immediate pain he
experienced in carrying out this activity, Mr. Wilburn's
injury on April 14, 1980 unquestionably constituted an
"unanticipated and unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of
events."

4

Appellant's position that the events leading to his
industrial injury unquestionably constitute a compensable
industrial accident is further supported by case law applying
the Carling definition.

For example, ip. Kaiser Steel

Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P. 2d 888 (l[jtah 1981), benefits
were awarded to an employee who suffered a back injury while
shoveling rock onto a conveyer belt.

The employee had

testified at the hearing that as he was shoveling, he
experienced a catch in his back.

He al^o stated that he could

identify no unusual incident such as breaking a shovel or
slipping on a rock that precipitated his back problem.
Additionally, the record indicated that the applicant had a
significant history of prior back problems.

In affirming the

Commission's award of benefits, the Utaji Supreme Court stated:
The applicant's history of woirk-related
accidents and his medical condition showed a
job-induced preexisting condition which
could have been added to or aggravated, by
the work-related incident that occurred on
January 5, 1979, or which could have reached
what this Court has referred |to as a 'climax'
due to 'exertion, stress, or other repetitive
cause . . . in such manner asl to properly
fall within the definition ofl an accident . .
. '. (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 892.
The Court also found a compensable industrial
accident in the case of Painter Motor Company v. Ostler,
617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).

In Painter, Ithe applicant had been

climbing a ladder and drilling holes for the installation of
electrical boxes.

This activity required him to hold a large

drill up and away from his body.
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Afteij doing this work for

some time, the applicant became aware of intensifying back and
shoulder pain.

Approximately four months later while moving

boxes of parts at his employer's place of business, the
employee again experienced pain in his back for which he
eventually underwent surgery.

Following his surgery, the

applicant filed an application for benefits which was denied by
the Administrative Law Judge.

The Commission reversed the

decision of the ALT following a Motion for Review by the
applicant and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Commission; in so doing it stated:
We have previously defined the term
'accident' as an unanticipated, unintended
occurrence different from what would normally
be expected to occur in the usual course of
events. Thus, if an employee incurs
unexpected injuries, including internal
failures, caused by the duties of his
employment, he is eligible for compensation
under §35-1-45. (Footnote omitted.)
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 976.
The broad manner in which the definition of
"accident1" was being applied by the Court at the time the
respondents raised the issue of "no accident" to Mr. Wilburn
is especially evident in its decision in Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).

In Schmidt,

the applicant's employment required him to move heavy pieces of
steel either alone or with the aid of fellow employees.

After

several months of work, the applicant began experiencing
significant problems with his back.

Because he could not

specify a particular time or occurrence giving rise to his then
present back problems, the Administrative Law Judge concluded
6

he was not entitled to compensation.

The Utah Supreme Court

reversed the finding of the Administrative Law Judge and
remanded the case to the Commission fot
issue of medical causation only.

a determination on the

In doing so, it stated:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled beyond
question an internal failure 'brought about by
exertion in the course of employment may be
an accident within the meaning of 35-1-45,
without the requirement that the injury
result from some incident which happened
suddenly and is identifiable jat a definite
time and place. . . .

It is equally well settled the injury
received may be accidental eyen though the
exertion is that required in the ordinary
course of employment. If an employee incurs
unexpected injuries, including "internal"
failures, caused by the ordinary duties of
his employment, he is eligible for
compensation under 35-1-45. (Footnotes
omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Schmidt at 695.
Respondents contend they wer^ justified in raising
the no accident defense because Mr. Wi]Jburn was not engaged
in any unusual activity at the time hi^ injury occurred.
However, as noted in the decision in Schmidt, it was well
settled by the year 1984 that an injury could be accidental
even though it was caused by the ordinary duties of
employment.

Furthermore, even if some rcype of unusual activity

were arguably required as contended by Respondents, Mr.
Wilburn's injury met the requirements o|f a compensable
accident.

This contention is supported! by the recorded

statement taken by Libby Lowther, an adjuster for National
Union, shortly after the accident.
7

Therein Ms. Lowther

specifically asked Mr. Wilburn if there was anything unusual
about his activities on the day of his injury.

He replied that

he generally lifted the power plants he was going to work on
from the front because they did not have any handles.

In this

particular case, however, he lifted the plant from his side
because it happened to have a handle on it.
of lifting that resulted in his injury.

It was this manner

(R. at 355.)

The cases cited by respondents in favor of their
position that the compensability of Mr. Wilburn's claim was
legitimately in dispute are distinguishable from Mr.
Wilburn1s case.

For example, in Church of Jesus Christ,

Etc. v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (1979), the
applicant had experienced no pain at all while performing his
regular employment duties.

It was only when he stood up

suddenly to answer the telephone that he felt pain in his
back.

Mr. Wilburn, on the other hand, was unquestionably

engaged in the duties of his employment when he suffered his
injury.

Furthermore, the manner in which he attempted to lift

the power plant to his workbench so that he could repair it was
unusual and directly led to his injury.
In the case of Farmer's Grain Co-Op v. Mason, 606
P.2d 237 (Utah 1980) cited by respondents, the applicant
noticed a gradual onset of back pain on two different occasions
after unloading 100 pound bags of whey.

After the second

incident, the pain did not subside, and he thereafter applied
for benefits.

The applicant had a significant history of back

problems and the medical panel chairman who examined the
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applicant stated in the panel report thjat the increased
injuries the applicant sustained would |have occurred "with or
without trauma, on or off the job, and from ordinary
activities; and that he would have developed back problems over
a period of time in his work regardlesd of any trauma."

Id.

at 23 9. There is no such evidence tha*q would support a finding
of no accident in the instant case.

Although Mr. Wilburn

admittedly had a prior back problem, hq had never missed work
as a result of it and he had only sought medical treatment for
his back on one occasion prior to his 1|980 injury (R. at 53,
82-83, 125.)
The cases of Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo,
642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) and Redman Warehousing Corporation
v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 39|8, 454 P.2d 283 (1969)
are also distinguishable from the facts| herein.

In Sabo's,

the applicant bent over to lift a box o|f twelve clock radios
and found he could not straighten up.

From the facts

described, it does not appear that any bffort other than
bending over had been exerted.

In sustaining the Commission's

holding of no accident, the Court specifically stated:
[I]t appear[ed] to be mere coincidence
that defendant's injury or malfunction
occurred at work. . . . Probf of the
causal relationship of duties, of employment
to unexpected injury is simply lacking.
Id. at 726.

Likewise, in Redman, the applicant first

experienced back pain after simply sitting and driving his
truck.

No particular exertion or stress could be identified as

the precipitating factor of his injury.
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The Court, therefore,

held that the events leading to the applicant's injury did not
constitute an accident that caused an injury.

In the

instant case, however, there was a specific identifiable
incident leading to Mr. Wilburn's injury.

Furthermore, the

medical evidence available specifically established that at
least a portion of Mr. Wilburn's resulting disability was
directly attributable to the industrial event.

All of this

information was available to the respondents prior to the time
they raised the issue of no accident.

It is obvious from the

case law that was in existence that the compensable nature of
Mr. Wilburn's injury was not, in fact, subject to legitimate
dispute at the time the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was
negotiated.

Furthermore, because compensability was not a

legitimate issue in Mr. Wilburn's case, the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement is invalid and should not be allowed to
stand as a bar to Mr. Wilburn's current claim.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WHERE THE QUESTION AT ISSUE
IS A QUESTION OF LAW AND THE INTERPRETATION
OF A CONTRACT IS A QUESTION OF LAW.
Mr. Wilburn does not contest the standard of review
cited by respondents by which this court is bound in reviewing
the findings of the Commission on questions of fact. However,
the issue presented herein is not a question of fact, rather,
it is a question of law.

The standard of review to be applied

in evaluating Commission decisions on questions of law is

10

identified in Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692
P. 2d 779 (Utah 1984).

In Dean Evans the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
In reviewing the Commission's
interpretations of general questions of law,
we apply a correction-of-error standard,
with no deference given to the Commission's
interpretations. (Citations omitted.)
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 782. See also Board of Education of Alpine
School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Ut. 1984) and
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685
The iissue on appeal herein
involves the interpretation of a Compromi se and Settlement

P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah, 1984).

Agreement executed by Mr. Wilburn and the respondents.

In

Morris v. Mountain States Telephone an4 Telegraph Company,
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983), the

Utah Supreme Court held that:

ff

[T]he interpretation of a contract is a question of law, to be

decided by the judge."

It then added:

It is true that some opinions seem to
qualify that rule by implying that it is
limited to circumstances whe^e there is no
ambiguity or no 'room for unclerta inty.'
And some decisions have reversed summary
judgments where the contract jwas ambiguous
and remanded for taking evidelnce and making
findings on the intent of the parties.
However, our decisions hold that whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law
which the court must decide before it tak¥s
any evidence in clarification. More"
importantly, our more recent casesHiold
that even the resolution of cpntract
ambiguities is a question of law for the
court. (Emphasis added)(Footnotes
omitted.)
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The same conclusion reached in Morris was also reached in
Overson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 587 P.2d 149
(Utah 1978).

In Overson the court made the following

observation:
The accepted principle is that the
interpretation of a contract's language is
usually a law matter. This principle was
articulated in the case of Central Credit
Collection Control Corp. v. Grayson [7
Wash.App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972)] as
follows:
Interpretation of a written
contract is usually a question
of law for the court. If its
terms are clear and
unambiguous, summary judgment
is proper. Even where some
ambiguity exists in the
contract, resolution of the
ambiguity is still a question
of law for the court, unless
contradictory evidence is
presented to clarify the
ambiguity. (Footnote omitted.)
Overson at 151.

See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth,

665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983).
Because the question at issue herein is one of
interpretation of a fully-integrated written contract and
because the interpretation of an integrated written contract is
a question of law, this court's review is not limited to a
determination of whether the Commission's findings are
supported by substantial competent evidence.

Rather this court

is entitled to review the evidence anew and make its own
determination as to whether the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement executed by the parties in 1984 effectively bars
appellant's current claim for permanent and total disability.
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POINT III
PAROL EVIDENCE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF INTERPRETING AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT WHICH
IS UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE.
Following his industrial injury of April 14, 1980,
Mr. Wilburn received from the defendants both temporary total
disability and permanent partial disability benefits.

The

latter benefits were paid in accordance with the finding of Dr.
W. E. Hess, the doctor to whom appellant had been referred for
an independent medical examination.

Dr. Hess found that Mr.

Wilburn had a 20 percent whole man impairment, 15 percent of
which he attributed to pre-existing causes and 5 percent of
which he attributed to Mr. Wilburn's industrial injury.
at 18 0, 3 06.)

(R.

Unfortunately, Mr. Wilburn's condition

continued to deteriorate following his examination by Dr.
Hess.

When his previous benefits terminated, Mr. Wilburn

again contacted National Union and requested additional
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability
benefits.

After receiving Mr. Wilburn1s request, National

Union referred Mr. Wilburn to Dr. Hess a second time to
obtain an updated opinion on his physical condition.

After his

second examination, Dr. Hess raised Mr. Wilburn's permanent
partial disability rating to 35 percent whole man.

(R at 189.)

Although Dr. Hess found Mr. Wilburnfs impairment to have
increased, National Union failed to reinstate Mr. Wilburn's
benefits.

Finally, on February 9, 1984, the claims
13

representative for National Union requested that Mr. Wilburn
meet with its counsel, Mr. Stuart Poelman, to discuss his
case.

(R at 31.)

During the course of this meeting, Mr.

Wilburn asked Mr. Poelman whether the respondents would be
willing to pay him an additional 10 percent permanent partial
disability based upon the added deterioration he had
experienced.

(R at 322, 323.)

Mr. Wilburn also asked Mr.

Poelman if he should assert a claim for permanent and total
disability.

Mr. Poelman appropriately replied that he could

not advise appellant on this issue since to do so would place
him in a conflict of interest.

(R. at 322) .

Thereafter, the

parties engaged in further discussions and negotiations which
eventually resulted in the execution of the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement at issue herein.

During the course of

these negotiations and prior to signing the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Wilburn completed and filed with
the Commission an Application for Hearing dated June 15, 1984.
This application was never processed due to the compromise
finally agreed upon by the parties.
The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was executed
by the parties in or around November, 1984.

Since that time,

Mr. Wilburn1s condition has continued to deteriorate, thus
resulting in his current claim for permanent and total
disability.

Although the Compromise and Settlement Agreement

does not discuss the issue of permanent and total disability
anywhere within its four corners, respondents contend that it
was intended to be a full and final settlement of all of Mr.

14

Wilburn1s claims arising out of his industrial injury and
that his claim for permanent and total disability is,
therefore, barred.

The Administrative Law Judge originally

ruled in favor of Mr. Wilburn on this issue but following a
Motion for Review by the respondents, he reversed his previous
decision and held that Mr. Wilburn's claim is barred.

This

finding was subsequently upheld by the Commission.
In reaching the conclusion tljiat the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement effectively bars Mr. Wilburn1s current
claim, the Administrative Law Judge clearly relied upon
testimony solicited at the time of the hearing regarding the
discussions and negotiations engaged in by the parties prior to
execution of the final document.

This fact is evident in

reviewing his Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order dated July 2, 1986.

In fact,i the Administrative Law

Judge specifically states therein:
Because of the particular circumstances
under which the Compromise anjd Settlement
Agreement of November 28, 19814 was
executed, and subsequently apbroved by
Legal Counsel for the Commission, the
Administrative Law Judge is constrained to
reverse his prior determination and find
that the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement was validly executed by the
parties as a Settlement of a pisputed Claim
and was not in violation of §t35-l-90,
U.C.A. (Emphasis added.)
(R. at 374.)

(See also Copy of Supplemental Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order attaphed hereto as Addendum
Exhibit B.)
It is a long standing rule of evidence in cases of
contract interpretation that parol evidence is inadmissible to
15

vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract
unambiguous on its face.

In Youngren v. John W. Lloyd

Construction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985, (1969) the
Utah Supreme Court held:
When parties have negotiated on a subject
and have thereafter entered into a written
contract, it should be assumed that their
prior negotiations are fused into the
contract so that it represents their full
agreement with respect thereto; and that,
consequently, after its due execution,
extraneous evidence should ordinarily not
be permitted to add to, subtract from,
vary, or contradict it. (footnote omitted.)
Id. at 987.
The same rule identified in Youngren was
reiterated in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
In Lamb the court stated:
Evidence of any prior oral agreement, which
contradicts the plain terms of the written
agreement, is inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule, for a party may not
establish a different contract on facts
known at the time of reducing their
understanding to written form. All
preliminary negotiations, conversations,
and verbal agreements are merged m and
superseded by the subsequent written
contract, and unless frauds accident or
mistake be averred, the writing constitutes
the agreement between the parties, and its
terms cannot be altered by parol
evidence. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote
omitted.)
Lamb at 607.

See also Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah

1978) ("The rule is well established, evidence of prior
negotiations is inadmissible to contradict terms of a final
instrument.11)
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In the instant case, it is ciear that the 1984
Compromise and Settlement Agreement was adopted by the parties
as the final and complete expression oj: their oral agreement.
The Agreement thus constitutes an integrated contract and parol
evidence may not be introduced to vary or add to its express
terms.

See Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 635 P.2d 1190,

1194 (Utah 1981) and Union Bank v. Sweijison, 707 P. 2d 663,
665 (Utah 1985) .
A review of the express language of the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement which is the Subject of this
litigation reveals only a compromise of appellant's claim for
additional temporary total disability 4nd permanent partial
disability benefits.

The term permanerit total disability

benefits is not mentioned even one timd within the four corners
of the document.

Thus, it is clear thajt the Administrative Law

Judge's finding that the Agreement was intended to settle a
claim for permanent and total disability came from sources
extraneous to the agreement itself.

Sihce according to the

express terms of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, the
parties were only settling Mr. Wilburn'£ claim for additional
permanent partial and temporary total disability benefits, the
Administrative Law Judge's reliance upoi^ parol evidence in
interpreting the contract was improper ^nd contrary to law.
Furthermore, because the Agreement make^ no express or implied
reference to a settlement of Mr. Wilburrt's right to claim
permanent and total disability, it does not preclude Mr.
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Wilburn from asserting a claim for permanent and total
disability at the present time.
POINT IV
ANY ALLEGED AMBIGUITIES IN THE COMPROMISE AND
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE RESOLVED
IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
Assuming arguendo that the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement contains ambiguities, those ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of Mr. Wilburn.
favor of this position.

Two reasons militate in

First, counsel for respondent National

Union was responsible for the drafting of the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement and second, Mr. Wilburn was not
represented by counsel in negotiating and executing the
Agreement.
It is a well-established rule in contract law that
" . . . any uncertainty with respect to construction of a
contract should be resolved against the party who [drew] the
agreement."
1982).

Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah

See also Matter of Estate of Orris, 622 P.2d 337,

339 (Utah 1980).

In the instant case, Stuart Poelman,

counsel for National Union, drafted the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement at issue. As previously stated, the
Agreement contains no language, express or implied, which
purports to settle Mr. Wilburn1s claim for permanent and
total disability.

In alleging that this was the actual intent

of the Agreement respondents point to the negotiations
preceding execution of the final document.
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Not once do they

cite the language of the Agreement itself.

This fact is

significant inasmuch as the very purpose of reducing an oral
agreement to writing is to specifically identify and preserve
the terms agreed upon by them.

Because counsel for National

Union was the drafting party and becauqe he had been personally
involved in all of the discussions and (negotiations leading up
to the execution of the final document, National Union had more
than ample opportunity to draft the agreement so that it
clearly reflected the rights and claims! each party was
relinquishing.

In spite of the opportunity it had to

specifically identify and preclude any future assertion of a
claim for permanent and total disability, however, the
respondents failed to even so much as Mention the subject of
permanent and total disability.

Furthe!rmore, respondents

failed to include any provision which mjight arguably serve as a
catch all barring any and all future cljaims Mr. Wilburn might
assert.

The respondents' failure to either discuss the issue

of permanent and total disability or identify the Agreement as
a full and final settlement of all claims which might be raised
by the appellant is, at the very least, odd in view of
respondents claim that permanent and total disability was the
very heart and soul of the negotiations leading to execution of
the final document.

It is hard to belifeve that experienced

counsel would fail to include even so m^ich as a passing
reference to the very claim allegedly settled as a result of
the parties1 oral negotiations.
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Additional doubt is cast upon the position of the
respondents in view of Mr. Wilburn's contention that at the
time he executed the Agreement in question it was his
understanding the only claims he was compromising were his then
current claims for additional temporary total disability and
permanent partial disability benefits based upon the additional
deterioration he had experienced in his physical condition
since the payment of his previous award.

(R. at 77.)

Defendants refer to Mr. Wilburn's testimony in this regard as
"self serving", however, it is no more "self serving" than the
position taken by respondents, especially in view of the
opportunities available to the respondents to clearly and
unquestionably preclude the very claim Mr. Wilburn is now
asserting.

Additionally, Mr. Wilburn's understanding of the

Compromise and Settlement Agreement is supported not only by
his own testimony but also by language in the Agreement
itself.

For example, while the Agreement does not discuss

permanent and total disability, it does specifically identify
Mr. Wilburn's claims for temporary total and permanent
partial disability and medical benefits.

Also, in Paragraph 3

of the Agreement, it states:
The Employer and The Fund agree that The
Fund will reimburse the Employer for
two-thirds of all future medical expense
and temporary total disability for which
liability to the applicant may be incurred.
Admittedly, this language refers only to an agreement between
the Employer and the Fund.

However, to the untrained eye of a

layman not represented by counsel, this language could
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reasonably be viewed as evidence that IJie would not be precluded
from asserting a future claim should h^s condition continue to
worsen inasmuch as the Employer and Th^ Fund were apparently
contemplating the possibility of incurring future liability on
his behalf.
The second factor militating in favor of construing
any potential ambiguities in the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement in favor of the appellant is the fact that Mr.
Wilburn was not represented by counsel Iduring either the
course of negotiations or at the time o|f execution of the final
written document.

Although respondents! state that Mr.

Wilburn consulted with Janet Moffitt, Robert Shaughnes^y
and Shaun Howell before signing the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement, a review of the record reveals that Mr.
Wilburn1 s conversations with Janet Moffitt took place well
before he ever met with Mr. Poelman about his claim.
122, 123.)

(R. at

Mr. Wilburn admittedly consulted with Robert

Shaughnessy about his case on one occasion, but this
consultation, too, took place before any negotiations were
undertaken with Mr. Poelman.

Furthermore, Mr. Wilburn did

not seek any advice from Mr. Shaughnessy regarding the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement unt^l sometime after tne
Agreement had already been signed.

(R. at 124.)

Thus, the

only legal counsel with whom Mr. Wilburii spoke directly about
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was Stuart Poelman,
counsel for the employer and insurer, arid Shaun Howell, legal
counsel to the Commission.

It is obvious from the very fact
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that this litigation has arisen, that the Compromise and
Settlement Agreement meant something different to Mr. Wilburn
than it did to Mr. Poelman, its drafter, especially with
regard to the language appearing in paragraph three as
aforementioned.

Ms. Howell, on the other hand, specifically

stated that she did not advise Mr. Wilburn one way or the
other regarding the advisability of signing the Agreement.
at 138.)

(R.

In essence, all she did was advise him on the

"possibilities."

(R. at 143.)

It is unclear from her

testimony the extent to which she may have actually discussed
the particular language of the Agreement itself with Mr.
Wilburn and any possible questions he may have had in this
regard.

However, during cross examination Ms. Howell was

specifically asked whether she ever discussed the
aforementioned paragraph three with Mr. Wilburn.

Her reply

was that she doubted very much she had discussed that portion
of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement with him.
150.)

(R. at

In view of these facts and circumstances and in view of

the fact that Mr. Wilburn is not trained in the subtleties of
the law, both law and equity require any ambiguities in the
written document to be interpreted most strictly against the
respondents.
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CONCLUSION
Utah law specifically provides that an employee
cannot waive his rights to worker's compensation benefits. In
the instant case, the respondents allege that the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement signed by Mr. Wilburn in November of
1984 bars his current claim for permanent and total
disability.

Purported settlement agreements in the area of

worker's compensation are valid only iff the compensable nature
of the applicant's claim is truly doubtful.

The facts and

circumstances giving rise to Mr. Wilburn's injury do not
render his claim doubtful under the la\^ as it existed at the
time the Compromise and Settlement Agrelement was negotiated and
thus the Agreement is invalid.
Should the Court determine thle Agreement to be valid,
however, it should be noted that it does not purport to bar Mr.
Wilburn's claim for permanent total disability benefits
either expressly or by implication.

Because the Agreement is

unambiguous on its face, it must be strictly construed in
accordance with its express terms.

Furthermore, any facial

ambiguities within the document itself Should be resolved in
favor of the applicant as he was the noil-drafting party and
he was not represented by counsel at the time it was executed.
Thus, the decision of the Commission denying Mr. Wilburn
permanent total disability should be reversed and his claim for
permanent and total disability should be! allowed.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this
1987.

/£*-day of

^f

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

IICtfAEL E. DYER
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY
Attorneys for Appellant
Gilbert R. Wilburn
WIL/01/SAM
jp71387
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, fijrst class, postage
prepaid on this /^-Z^- day of

L^^i^_

, 1987, to each of the

following counsel of record:

Stuart L. Poelman
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Respondents
Interstate Electric and
National Union Fire Ins. Co.
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Erie V. Boorman
SECOND INJURY FUND
Attorney for Respondent
Second Injury Fund
P.O. BOX 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 0F UTAH
160 East 300 South

Salt Lake City, Utah

'f^UL^,

WIL/01/SAM
jp71387
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EXHIBIT A

- BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTj$'7; \l •'*
• • • • ••

• • •: "•*•-

Case No. 810009b9
GILBERT WILBURN,
Applicant-Employee,
VS.

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Employee-Carrier.

THIS AGREEMENT entered into this d|ate by and between
Gilbert R. Wilburn (hereinafter called "Applicant"), Interstate Electric and National Union Fire Insurance (hereinafter
collectively called "Employer"), and Tljie Second Injury Fund
(hereinafter collectively called "The ^und"),
WHEREAS, Applicant claims to have Sustained an injury by
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment
with Interstate Electric on April 14, l|980fl and

I

WHEREAS, the parties hereto have previously entered into
a compensation agreement pursuant to wh|ich certain workmen1 s
compensation benefits have been paid to| the applicant and
pursuant to which an order for reimbursement has been entered

#

•

•

•

• • •

• •••-»-»•->
• • ••
•"
•
•
• ••-*->
•
• •
• • •

by the Commission whereby The Fund has been ordered to reimburse the Employer for 75% of all medical expensestaYjd! tje&i- I II
• •

••••

••••

porary total disability benefits paid, and
WHEREAS, the Applicant now claims that he is entitled to
additional benefits but the Employer and The Fund dispute
said claim and also deny liability for any benefits which
have been paid or are yet claimed by Applicant under the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act, and
WHEREAS, the Employer has paid to or on behalf of Applicant temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits
in the total sum of $41,054.66 for which the Fund has not yet
reimbursed the Employer for its pro rata share, and
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that there exists a
serious and disputed question as to whether or not the
Employer is liable to the Applicant for any benefits under
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, and
WHEREAS, it is the intent and desire of the Applicant,
the Employer and The Fund that the said claim of the Applicant be compromised and settled so as to avoid the necessity
of further litigation, and
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement have carefully
considered their respective positions with respect to said
claims and have concluded that the settlement of claims
herein made is fair and equitable in every respect*

-2-

?Sft

• I
•

NOW, THEREFORE, in reliance of tt}e foregoing recitals and
• •

• • **

• •

•**

in consideration of the following terims and obligations^ 5:he • •"•'•*
••

• • > • • -

•

parties agree:
1.

Employer shall pay to Applicant the additional sum

of $1,590.00 representing additional temporary total disability plus the sum of $2,184.00 representing an additional
5% permanent partial disability over ^nd above those amounts
which it has already paid to Applicant.
2. . The Fund shall pay to Applicant the sum of $2,184.0C
representing an additional 5% permanent partial disability
over and above those amount which The |Fund has already paid
to Applicant.
3.

The Fund shall reimburse the Employer for two-thirds

of all temporary total disability and Medical benefits heretofore and now paid by the Employer fof which the Employer
has not yet received any reimbursement from The Fund, which
two-thirds reimbursement is calculated to be in the total sum
of $28,429.77. The Employer and The FUnd agree that The Fund
will reimburse the Employer for two-thilrds of all future
medical expense and temporary total disability for which
liability to the Applicant may be incurred.
4.

It is understood and agreed by and between the par-

ties that this Agreement constitutes a cpompromise of a disputed claim and does not constitute an admission of any fact,
contention or liability on the part of ^ny of the parties.
-3-
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•
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•
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•

• •
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•

• •
•

•

•
•

5.
This Agreement shall become binding and effective
#
only when approved by the Industrial Commission c•JfT•Clt•fa•h,•:• : ••:•:- r.
i
• *
• •

DATED this

day of

• • « •

• • • •

_, 1984.
APPLICANT:

Gilbert R. Wilburn
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCI

-r
THE SECOND INJURY FUNR:

Approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah:

_ W/A rtw,

.
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CERTIFICATE OF RAILING

I certify

t h a t on

November 28

a copy of t h e a t t a c h e d

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 1

was m a i l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g
addresses/

postage

t 19 84

persons at the

following

paid:

Sandra Southern'
Unigar'tk^nsurattce Group
4444\ S6ut^i<im East
J ^ t Lake City>sIJtafi>A4107
Gilbert A, Martinez
Administrator
Second Injury Fund
Stuart L. Poelman, Esduire
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place - Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah JJ4110
Gilbert R. Wilburn
1920 South 50 West
Bountiful, Utah 8401Q

T H E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

Diapa M. Hocking

EXHIBIT B

- ^ :

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ^

. ... g

^DWii

Case No. 86000196

GILBERT R. WILBURN,
Applicant,
VS.

\

7

/

\W

*

SUPPLEMENTAL

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and/or
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF
PITTSBURGH and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

*
*
*
*

AND ORDER

*

Defendants.

*
*

Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered
in this matter on May 28, 1986. A Motion for Review was timely filed by the
Defendants on June 13, 1986. Part of the Motion sought clarification of
various portions of the Order, but the Administrative Law Judge is
particularly concerned with that part of the Motion which seeks a reversal of
the basic determination relative to the Compromise and Settlement Agreement
entered into between the parties on November 28, 1984. Applicant's response
to the Motion has also been considered.
As stated in the original Findings of Fact, the Administrative Law
Judge believes the Applicant's claim is controlled by the holdings in the two
cases cited in the original Findings.
These cases are Briftham Young
University v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 279 P 889 (1929) and Barber Asphalt
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 103 Utah 371, 135 P2d 266, (1943). The BYU
case approved a Stipulation and Settlement of j a Disputed Claim where the
compensability of the claim was a close issue.
The Court explained in the BYU caie what was meant by the
compensability of the claim being a close issue by stating it was one
"concerning which reasonable minds may well diffej:, and where the right of the
Applicant to recover is doubtful." Although the I Settlement Agreement entered
into was invalidated by the Court, the decision in the Barber Asphalt case is
consistent with the BYU case. In the Barber Asphalt case, there was no issue
as to the fact that the Applicant's injury arose out of or in the course of
his employment as a result of a compensable industrial accident. This was in
sharp contrast to the BYU case in which the Court specifically stated the
compensability of the claim was a close issue Tconcerning which reasonable
minds might well differ and the right of th^ Applicant to recover was
doubtful."

GILBERT R. WILBURN
ORDER
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In the original Order, the Administrative Law Judge expressed his
opinion that there was no doubt as to the compensability of the Applicant's*
claim. Upon further reflection, the Administrative Law Judge would still find
the Applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident. But the critical
issue now seems to be not so much what the finding of the Administrative Law
Judge would have been in retrospect, but whether such a finding, made at this
time, can supplant the previous Compromise and Settlement Agreement which, on
its face, constituted a Compromise and Settlement Agreement of a disputed
claim.
In his Motion for Review, Counsel for the Defendants has correctly
stated that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement of November 28, 1984, was
(1) entered into between the parties in good faith, (2) the parties stipulated
that there v/as a bonafide issue as to the compensability of the Applicant's
claim at the time of said Agreement, (3) there was a specific finding in the
original Order of May 28, 1986, that the Defendants acted in good faith in
asserting the defense of "no accident" in connection with the Agreement, and
(4) the Agreement was approved by the Industrial Commission's Legal Counsel.
The Settlement of any claim is usually a desirable objective. The
settlement of a disputed claim is particularly desirable because an
adjudication of the claim seldom satisfies both parties and frequently leads
to appeals and delays that thwart the beneficent purposes of workmen's
compensation legislation. The policy of the Commission has been, and should
continue to be, one that encourages the settlement of claims. It has been the
longstanding practice of the Industrial Commission to approve settlements.
This practice has operated as a safeguard against abuses that might otherwise
occur, if an unscrupulous employer or insurance carrier attempted to take
advantage of an unsophisticated worker seeking to settle a claim without the
advice of counsel. The practice also affords some protection against clerical
errors in the calculation of benefits payable to an Applicant.
In Mr. Wilburn's case, he was advised to and did discuss his claim
with an attorney, but at the time he signed the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement, he was not represented by counsel. He did, however, discuss the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement with the Commission's Le'gal Counsel, who
approved the Settlement after discussing all of its ramifications with the
Applicant. Based upon the testimony of the Commission's former legal counsel
who approved this particular Agreement, and based upon the Applicant's own
testimony, there can be little doubt that the Applicant gave long and serious
consideration to the execution of this Agreement. This was not an Agreement
that was prepared on the spur of the moment and signed hastily. It was, in
fact, prepared weeks, if not months, before it was actually executed. By his
own admission, the Applicant, at the time the Agreement was signed, was
extremely concerned about ensuring a continuation of his medical benefits
which were assured if he agreed to the terms of the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement.
If not, there is no doubt that the Applicant understood the
possibility of losing that benefit if he were to lose his claim on the issue
of "no accident."
The Applicant had previously received substantial

GILBERT R. UILBURN
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compensation benefits and was offered
continuation of his medical benefits.

additional benefits, as well

as a

Under the foregoing circumstances surrounding the execution of the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, the issue is perhaps not so much a matter
of whether the Administrative Law Judge believes the Applicant sustained a
compensable industrial accident as it is a matter of what the parties believed
and acted upon, at the time the Compensation Agreement was executed* The
Defendants were undoubtedly relying upon the information furnished the
insurance adjustor by the Applicant on May 22J 1980, at which time, the
adjustor took a recorded statement as to how the injury occurred and the
timing of the pain the Applicant felt in connection with his injury. This
statement is not in evidence, but it does provide some understanding of the
Defendant's point of view. The transcript does not change the opinion of the
Administrative Law Judge.as to the compensability of the Applicant's claim,
but it does help explain why the Applicant elected to execute the Agreement
rather than submit his claim to the Commission for adjudication.
Because of the particular circumstances under which the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement of November 28, 1984 was! executed, and subsequently
approved by Legal Counsel for the Commission, the Administrative Law Judge is
constrained to reverse his prior determination and find that the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement was validly executed by the parties as a Settlement
of a Disputed Claim and was not in violation of Section 35-1-90, U.C.A. The
Administrative
Law
Judge
realizes
the harsn
consequences
of
this
determination. Mr. Wilburn is a very likeable person and is undoubtedly in
need of whatever benefits or compensation he can optain. However, compassion
for the Applicant does not justify the erosion of a principle and policy
pertaining to Compensation Agreements generally. As stated in the original
Order, the award of compensation could only be justified if reasonable minds
could not differ as to the compensability of the Applicant's claim. The fact
that the Administrative Law Judge would have no difficulty in finding the
Applicant's claim compensable does not, at this time, supplant the judgment of
those who earlier, in good faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful
compensability. The Applicant had pondered the effect of the Agreement for
several months and had discussed the same fully with the Commission's Legal
Counsel and with an attorney. To invalidate the Agreement at this time would
seriously undermine the entire settlement process, rendering such so uncertain
and unpredictable as to seldom be worthy of serious consideration.

GILBERT R. WILBURN
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For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Interim Order of May 28, 1986, be, and
the same is hereby, vacated and set aside and the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement entered into between the parties and approved by the Commission on
November 28, 1984, is deemed binding upon the parties, precluding the
Applicant from asserting a claim at this time. Having vacated the prior
Order, the other matters in the original Interim Order on which the Defendants
sought clarification are now moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
_day of Juno, 1986
ATTEST

Linda J. Sirp^burg
Commissidp Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on July
</L
1986, a copy of the attached
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the case of
Gilbert R. Wilburn issued July
JL
1986 , was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid
Gilbert R. Wilburn, 1920 South 50 West,, Bountiful, UT 84010
Michael E. Dyer, Atty., P.O. Box 2465, SLC, UT 84110
Stuart L. Poelman, Atty., P.O. Box 30001, SLC, UT 84110
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator Second Injury Fund
National Union Fire Insurance Company ot Pittsburgh, c/o American
International Adjusting, P.O. Box 6159, SLC, UT 84106
Interstate Electric, 1000 West Center Street, North Salt Lake
UT 84054
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